Your phone before a border crossing or a protest

For anyone entering or leaving Russia or Belarus, or going somewhere they could be detained: a protest, a friend's trial, a police summons.

The 5-minute minimum

• Turn off face and fingerprint unlock and set a long passcode with letters and digits. Your finger or face can be put to the phone against your will, but nobody can learn the passcode without you: they would have to ask you for it. iPhone: Settings → Face ID & Passcode. Android 16 (Pixel): Settings → Security & privacy → Device unlock.
• Hide notification text on the lock screen so messages can't be read without the passcode. iPhone: Settings → Notifications → Show Previews → Never. Android 16: Settings → Notifications → Notifications on lock screen → turn off 'Show sensitive content'.
• Switch the phone off before a check or a detention. After it is switched back on, until the passcode is entered, your data is best protected. If there is no time to switch it off: on an iPhone hold the side button and a volume button for 2 seconds; on a Pixel press Power and Volume Up and choose Lockdown. After that the phone opens only with the passcode.
• Write your lawyer's and a close person's numbers on paper. Agree on when you will get in touch and what that person will do if you disappear.
• Check that Telegram has a cloud password turned on (see 'Telegram: a 5-minute privacy setup').

If you are at risk

• Rights groups advise not taking your main phone, laptop or tablet across the border: they are hard to prepare for inspection. A separate inexpensive phone with your own SIM card and new accounts is safer.
• Prepare that phone a few weeks ahead so it looks ordinary: chats with family, photos, games, maps, food delivery. An empty or freshly reset phone may raise questions. But if there was no time to prepare, an empty phone is still better than your main one (this is the view of the authors of the Meduza guide).
• Don't sign in to your main Telegram, Google or Apple ID on the travel phone: signing in brings back subscriptions, chats, photos and history. Check that no eSIM with your main number is left on it.
• If you can't do without your main phone and there is no case against you, prepare it in advance, not in the queue: leave risky chats and channels, delete apps of independent media and foreign banks, check your gallery, cloud and Recently Deleted. Deleted data is often recovered with special software, so at high risk it is better to leave the main phone behind.
• Law No. 257-FZ of 23.07.2025 lets border guards 'inspect and examine' belongings, including phones and laptops. Refusing to show a device falls under CAO art. 18.7: a fine of 5,000 to 7,000 roubles or up to 15 days' arrest. The law does not allow them to demand that you unlock the phone or to read your messages, but in practice officers demand it and threaten a report. A travel phone is prepared so that you can unlock it and show it without harm to yourself. For your main phone there is no simple answer: decide with a lawyer in advance how to respond.
• At high risk, turn on Lockdown Mode on an iPhone: Settings → Privacy & Security → Lockdown Mode. It limits connections to a computer and some attacks. On Android 16 a similar mode is called Advanced Protection: Settings → Security & privacy → Advanced Protection. Among other things, it protects the USB port on a locked phone and restarts the phone if it has not been unlocked for 72 hours.
• It is safer to go to a protest without a phone or with a phone that has no important data on it. A phone that is switched on shows the operator where you have been, and cameras with facial recognition work without it anyway.

What not to do

• Don't delete everything at the last minute: mass deletion is noticeable and deleted data can be recovered.
• Don't take your main phone if you can avoid it. If you had no time to prepare a separate phone, an empty one is better than your main one, but be ready to calmly explain why it is new.
• Don't carry other people's phones or SIM cards: it doesn't protect you and can harm both you and the owner.
• Don't type your passcode in front of officers unless you have to: they watch it and then open the phone without you.
• Don't give passwords to your email, cloud or other accounts if officers have not reached them on the phone itself.
• Don't try to take the phone back by force. If it is seized, demand a report and a copy of it.
• If a case has been opened, a report drawn up or your phone seized, don't delete anything without a lawyer: deletion can be used against you and won't remove what the authorities have already copied.

What traces remain

• While your phone is on and connected, the operator knows which cell towers it was near. This data is stored and available to the security services.
• Deleted messages and photos are often recovered from the phone itself and from cloud backups. According to First Line, in 2024 at Vnukovo the security services retrieved deleted data from an iCloud backup.
• Bank transfers, Telegram Stars and messages on the other person's phone remain even if you deleted everything on yours. Your Stars history cannot be deleted from the account.
• According to a lawyer quoted by Meduza ('undesirable'), a copy of the phone made at the border is kept even if the person is let go.
• Officers try to break into even a locked phone with special devices: Citizen Lab described how Russian security services broke into a rights defender's iPhone using Cellebrite. A long passcode and recent updates make this harder.
• Your list of Telegram channels and chats is stored on the server and comes back the next time you sign in to the account.

current as of 26 September 2026. More: OVD-Info: crossing the Russian border (updated 23.09.2026) (foreign agent, extremist, on Rosfinmonitoring list); First Line: preparing your devices for the border (updated 03.05.2026); Meduza: border officers can copy your whole phone, what helps (28.08.2026, Russian) (undesirable); Meduza: preparing your phone for the Russian border (29.08.2026) (undesirable); Teplitsa of Social Technologies: crossing the Russian border with a smartphone (07.11.2025) (foreign agent); First Department: assessing the risks before returning to Russia (21.05.2025) (foreign agent); EFF Surveillance Self-Defense: attending a protest (Russian); Citizen Lab: Russia breaks into a human rights activist's phone with Cellebrite (25.06.2026); First Line: I need to travel to Russia (updated 20.06.2026)